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Abstract:  
We investigate the economic relevance and the composition of gifts within a firm where 
output is contractible. We develop a structural econometric model that identifies workers’ 
optimal reaction to monetary gifts received from their employer. We estimate the model 
using data from two separate field experiments, both conducted within a tree-planting 
firm. We use the estimated structural parameters to generalize beyond the experiment, 
simulating how workers would react to different gifts on the part of the firm, within 
different labour-market settings. We find that gifts have a role to play within this firm, 
increasing in importance when the workers’ outside alternatives deteriorate. Profit-
maximizing gifts would increase profits within slack labour markets by up to 10% on 
average and by up to 17% for certain types of workers. These gifts represent significant 
increases in worker earnings; the average gift paid to workers attains 22% of average 
expected earnings in the absence of gifts. We find that gifts should be given by setting 
piece-rates above the market-clearing level rather than through fixed wages. 
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1 Introduction
Economists are paying increasing attention to the role that gift giving can play within
the firm. Theoretical models (dating to Akerlof, 1982) suggest that gifts induce reciprocal
worker effort, implying that gift giving can be part of a firm’s personnel policy. Experimen-
tal studies (both laboratory and field) have shown that workers do respond to monetary
gifts from their employer, at least in the short run, by increasing their productivity (see, for
example, Fehr, Kirchsteiger and Reidl, 1993; Gneezy and List, 2006; Bellemare and Shearer,
2009). However, a positive reaction of workers to gifts does not guarantee that gift-giving
is a profitable policy option for the firm – the value of marginal effort to the firm may be
less than the value of the gift.
Experiments which calculate treatment effects can evaluate profitability only within a
specific environment, and have provided mixed evidence on this issue (eg. Fehr, Kirch-
steiger and Reidl, 1993; Gneezy and List, 2006).1 However, experimental gifts are typically
chosen by researchers, not the firm. What is more, the lack of profitability of a specific gift,
within a specific economic environment, does not rule out the economic relevance of gift-
giving in general – other gifts, not observed within a particular experiment, may generate
profits.
In this paper, we consider the economic return to gift-giving within a tree-planting
firm where output is contractible, allowing the firm to pay their workers piece rates. Our
econometric analysis is based on field experiments conducted within the firm. We define
gifts to be changes in the contract that increase worker utility and are explained to the
workers as acts of kindness. We investigate whether gifts have an economic role to play
within this contracting environment, and if so, under what economic conditions. We also
consider the composition of the gift; when output is contractible gifts can be given through
base wages and/or increases in the piece rate. We generalize the definition of a gift to take
account of its composition and consider the performance of different types of gifts.
Characterizing the firm’s economic return to gifts requires observing (or predicting)
the response of workers to different gifts, under different economic conditions. Repeated
1Falk (2007) finds that gift-giving is a profitable device to raise charitable contributions.
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experiments may not be practical in this regard, particularly in the field. Most experi-
mental work on gifts seeks to isolate the response to the gift from the response to future
surpluses within the firm. Consequently, gifts are presented as one-time-events (Gneezy
and List (2006)), precluding repeated experiments. As well, most field experiments seek to
avoid Hawthorne Effects2 by keeping workers ignorant of the fact that they are participat-
ing in an experiment; examples include Gneezy and List (2006) and Bellemare and Shearer
(2009). This requires explaining the gift in a manner that is credible to the workers, yet
exceptional. Repeating experiments may jeopardize the credibility of these explanations,
contaminating the results.3 Finally, economic (or labour-market) conditions cannot be ran-
domly assigned in typical field (or social) experiments (Heckman and Smith ,1995). This
renders impractical the experimental measurement of gift performance in different eco-
nomic environments.
An alternative approach is to exploit the observed behaviour within a limited number
of experiments to estimate structural parameters that govern worker responses to gifts.
These parameters can then be used to predict the profitability of different gifts under dif-
ferent economic (and labour market) conditions, even those not observed within a partic-
ular experiment. Applying structural models to experimental data has been advocated by
Heckman and Smith (1995) as a means of permitting generalization. It has been applied
to social experiments by Todd and Wolpin (2006) and by Lise, Seitz and Smith (2005) and
to firm-level field experiments by Shearer (2004) and Paarsch and Shearer (2008). We fol-
low this approach, developing and estimating an economic model of gift giving within the
tree-planting firm.
In our model, a worker’s effort decision is governed by two key parameters: one mea-
suring the curvature of the cost of effort function and another, a kindness parameter, mea-
suring the worker’s response to monetary gifts from the firm. Modelling worker utility as
a function of kindness is in the spirit of Rabin’s (1993) theoretical work on fairness and reci-
2If workers know that they are participating in an experiment their behaviour may be affected, limiting the
generalizeability of the experimental results.
3Randomizing gifts within a single experiment can create jealousies among workers within the firm and
may be ruled out on principle by firm managers. In Bellemare and Shearer (2009), the firm insisted that the
gift be the same to everybody.
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procity. We show that optimal gift-giving/piece-rate contracts can be calculated from the
knowledge of these parameters and an additional parameter, capturing general working
conditions.
We identify our model through a series of field experiments conducted within the tree-
planting firm. During the first experiment (which we call “the piece-rate experiment”)
the piece rate paid to workers was exogenously increased by between 20 and 28 percent.
The recorded data, containing information on the number of trees each worker planted
and the piece rate they received, identifies the curvature of the worker’s cost of effort
function. During the second experiment (which we denote “the gift experiment”), workers
received a monetary gift of $80 (independent of their productivity) from their employer,
in addition to their regular piece rate. This represented a substantial amount of money to
these workers, approximately 40% of average daily earnings. The recorded data, which
contains information on the number of trees planted with and without the gift, identifies
the worker’s kindness parameter, conditional on the cost of effort.
Our results show that gifts do have a role to play within this firm. While the experi-
mental gift did not generate a profitable response, other gifts would have been profitable,
at least under certain economic conditions. Our analysis points to the importance of the
substitutability of piece rates and gifts, and crowding out – under economic conditions
which lead to low-powered incentives, gifts become more profitable. This is captured in
our model by labour-market conditions which determine piece rates in the absence of gifts.
Under slack labour-market conditions, market-clearing piece rates are lower, implying a
greater role for gifts within the firm. Moreover, our results indicate that worker sensitiv-
ity to the firm’s kindness is heterogeneous; approximately one-half of the workers in our
sample exhibit no significant preferences for reciprocity.
Our policy analysis concentrates on three questions. First, we consider whether an-
other base-wage gift would have generated a profitable response within the conducted
experiment. Here, our results are negative – the explicit incentives provided by the ob-
served piece rate (20 cents per tree) reduce the profitability of base-wage gifts. Second,
we ask if a piece-rate gift would have been profitable. In this case we find that piece-rate
gifts would increase firm profits, but only under labour-market conditions which lead to
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low piece rates in the absence of gifts. Piece-rate gifts are particularly profitable for work-
ers who have strong reciprocal preferences – profit increases can attain 14% for certain
workers among this group. Finally, we ask if more general (composite) gifts, including a
base wage and a piece rate, would have been profitable. Here, we find that gifts would
increase profits per worker by up to 10% on average, and by up to 17% for workers ex-
hibiting strongly reciprocal preferences. In terms of composition: we find that profitable
gifts should be provided by setting higher than market clearing piece-rates rather than a
positive base wage. This is explained in our model by the fact that the workers in our
sample respond more strongly to piece-rate gifts than to base wage gifts.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The next section describes the institu-
tional setting of the tree-planting industry in British Columbia and the firm in which the
experiment took place. In Section 3 we describe the experiments. Section 4 presents the
economic model. In Section 5 we discuss identification. In Sections 6 and 7 we present the
descriptive statistics and the estimation results. In Section 8 we present our policy analysis
and in Section 9 we conclude.
2 Tree Planting in British Columbia
2.1 The Industry
Tree planting is a simple, yet physically exhausting, task. It involves digging a hole with
a special shovel, placing a seedling in this hole, and then covering its roots with soil, en-
suring that the tree is upright and that the roots are fully covered. The amount of effort
required to perform the task depends on the terrain on which the planting is done and
weather conditions. Flat plateaux are much easier to plant than steep mountain sides and
hard, rocky soil is more difficult to plant than soft terrain.
Tracts of land that have recently been logged are allocated to tree-planting firms through
a process of competitive bidding. These auctions typically take place in the autumn of the
year preceding the planting season, which generally runs from early spring through to late
summer. Planters are paid using piece-rate contracts. Under these contracts, planters are
paid in proportion to their output. Generally, no explicit base wage or production stan-
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dard exists, although firms are governed by minimum-wage laws. Output is measured as
the number of trees planted per day.
2.2 The Firm
Our experiments were conducted within a medium sized tree-planting firm that employs
approximately 70 planters per year. The planters represent a broad group of individuals,
including returning seasonal workers and students working on their summer holidays.
They range in age from 19 to 56.
This firm pays its planters piece rates; daily earnings for a planter are determined by
the product of the piece rate and the number of trees the planter planted on that day. Blocks
to be planted typically contain between 20 and 30 planter-days of work, with some lasting
over 100 planter-days. For each block, the firm decides on a piece rate that applies to all
planting done on the block. The piece rate for a particular block is set as a function of the
labour-market conditions and the planting terrain on that block. Since planting conditions
affect the number of trees that workers can plant, blocks for which average conditions are
more difficult require higher piece rates to attract planters.
Contracts, comprising a number of blocks in the same geographic area, are planted by
crews of workers under a supervisor. Each crew typically has from 10 to 20 planters. All
workers planting on the same block receive the same piece rate; no matching of workers to
planting conditions occurs. Typically, planters are assigned to plots within a block as they
disembark from the ground transportation taking them to the planting site. They also have
little contact with other workers during their work day. Thus, to a first approximation,
planters were randomly assigned to plots. Identification of our structural model exploits
the exogenous variation induced by two experiments conducted inside this firm.
6
3 The Field Experiments
3.1 The Piece-Rate Experiment
The piece-rate experiment took place on three separate blocks, over a three-month period
in 2003.4 During the experiment, each homogeneous block was divided into two parts.
One of these parts was then randomly chosen to be planted under the regular piece rate,
the other to be planted under the treatment piece rate (equal to the regular piece rate plus
five cents). The regular piece rates paid on these blocks were 18 cents and 23 cents, respec-
tively. The treatment piece rates therefore represented an increase of between 21 and 27
percent above the regular piece rate; 21 planters participated in the piece-rate experiment.
In order to avoid workers interpreting the experimental changes in the piece-rate as
gifts from the firm, these changes were presented to the workers within the context of the
normal daily operations of the firm. To this effect, the firm presented the treatment and
control blocks as separate blocks, with separate piece rates.5 Note that this required spatial
separation of the plots to be planted under each piece rate. As such, individual plots could
not be randomly assigned to regular and treatment piece rates, but rather half of the block
was randomly assigned to regular and half to treatment piece rates.
3.2 The Gift Experiment
The gift experiment6 took place on one homogeneous planting block which was planted
over a seven-day period in June, 2006. This seven-day period was spread over two weeks.
The first and second days of planting on the block took place on Thursday and Friday of
the first week. The remaining 5 days of planting on the block took place from Monday to
Friday of the following week. The piece rate paid to planters on this block was $0.20 per
4Data from this experiment were first analyzed in Paarsch and Shearer (2008). We refer the reader to that
paper for a complete discussion of the experiment and the data.
5 A convincing explanation for the difference in piece rates was prepared invoking the fact that conditions
on the treatment blocks had changed since the original bidding. This sometimes happens when the block has
been unexpectedly prepared (cleared of debris) by the government. In practice, no explanation was needed as
none of the planters questioned the higher piece rates.
6This discussion parallels that found in Bellemare and Shearer (2009) which analysed these data using an
unrestricted econometric framework.
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tree. Eighteen planters were involved in the experiment, each planting between two and
seven days on the experimental block. All eighteen planters were present for the second
and third days of planting on the experimental block.
Upon arrival at the experimental block for the second day of planting, planters were
informed that they would receive a lump-sum of $80 for that day’s work, in addition to the
regular piece rate of twenty cents per tree. In order to avoid any effects of the experiment
on participation, the $80 was presented to the planters after they had departed from the
base camp.
Workers in the gift experiment were unaware that they were participating in an exper-
iment. This allowed us to formulate the money as a gift to the planters from the firm and
to observe the worker‘s response to that gift in their natural work environment. To this
end, planters were told by the firm manager that there was extra money in the contract
since some of the previously-planted blocks had been expected to present access problems
to the workers. This caused the firm to bid “walkin” compensation to the contract for
those blocks.7 In the end, the access problems did not materialize and the compensation
was not needed. In spite of this, the manager had decided to share the extra money with
the planters. This represented a realistic explanation to the workers since access problems
occur occasionally and “walkin-fees” are the typical solution of the firm when they occur.8
A second important feature of our design is that workers were told the gift was a one-
time event that would not be repeated. This was reinforced by attaching the gift to an
extremely rare occurrence, minimizing any repeated-game effects whereby the workers
might respond in the hopes of earning future gifts (or surpluses); see, for example, Shapiro
and Stiglitz (1984) or Macleod and Malcolmson, (1989). Access problems requiring walkin
fees occur on approximately 2-3% of all planting blocks. The firm plants approximately
300 blocks in a given year and most workers are affected only once or twice per year. That
in itself is a rare event. Even more exceptional is the fact that the originally observed access
problems did not materialize – the government unexpectedly opened an access road. Firm
managers affirmed that, while this does occur, (the government sometimes acts to open up
7“Walkin-fees” compensate planters for time spent walking into planting sites and are bid into contracts to
plant sites that are difficult to access.
8None of the planters questioned this explanation.
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areas to logging), it was an extremely rare event, occurring on perhaps 1% of the blocks for
which walkin fees are bid.9
Finally, the manager was instructed to treat the day of the gift as a normal working day:
planters worked the same number of hours as a regular workday and were monitored in
the same way. What is more, the manager reported that nothing out of the ordinary (such
as a truck breaking down or trees being delivered late) occurred on that day that would
affect planting.
4 Economic Model
In this section, we present our model which can be used to analyse the profitability of
different gift-giving contracts. The next section discusses the identification of the model
using the exogenous variation in piece-rates and gifts provided by our field experiments.
4.1 Technology
The daily output of worker i on block j, Yij, is a function of worker effort, Eij and a random
production shock, Sij. We specify
Yij = EijSij (1)
where Sij is a positive random variable with
Sij ∼ I ID(µj, σ2j ). (2)
4.2 Utility
Workers have utility functions given by
Ui(Wij, Eij) = Wij − Ci(Eij) + β(Yij −YNGij )Gij (3)
where Wij represents daily earnings and C(Eij) is the worker’s cost of effort function and
β(Yij −YNGij )Gij represents the kindness function, capturing how workers respond to gifts
9This suggests that the event will occur approximately once in every 3000 blocks planted, implying a
worker would have to work, on average, 10 years in the firm to experience it.
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from the firm.10 Following the work of Rabin (1993) on fairness, (3) specifies that the
worker receives utility from returning value to the firm (in terms of output Yij) above YNGij
(defined below in (5b)), the productivity level of the worker in the absence of gifts. The
utility gained is proportional to the size of the gift Gij (or kindness) received from the firm
(defined in (6)). We specify the cost of effort function as a power function
Ci(Eij) = κi
γ
γ + 1
E(γ+1)/γij (4)
where, γ is a curvature parameter and κi allows for individual heterogeneity.
We first develop our model under piece rates, in the absence of gifts. This is the typical
compensation system of the firm. Later we extend the model to consider gifts. In develop-
ing our model, we closely follow the actual piece-rate setting policy of the firm, based on
extensive interviews with firm managers.
4.3 Timing
The timing of events in our model is as follows:
• for a particular block j to be planted, Nature chooses the pair (µj, σ2j ), the parameters
of the distribution of Sij;
• the firm observes (µj, σ2j ), and then chooses a contract ωj;
• the planter observes (µj, σ2j , ωj), and accepts or rejects the contract;
• if the planter accepts the contract, then he is randomly assigned to plant a particular
plot on the block (ie, sij, a particular value of Sij is attributed to the planter);
• the planter observes sij, and chooses an effort level Eij producing output Yij;
• the firm observes Yij, and pays earnings Wij.
To solve the model, we work backwards. First, we solve for the planter’s optimal effort
level conditional on a given piece rate and productivity shock. Then we solve for the
10βG represents the marginal utility of returning value to the firm. β, therefore, represents the marginal
utility of returning value to the firm per dollar of gift received.
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firm’s choice of the piece rate, taking the reaction of the planter as given. Note that, in
order to induce the planter to accept the contract, the contract must satisfy the planter’s
participation constraint.
4.4 Piece Rates
Under piece-rate contracts all workers receive the same piece-rate rj on block j: Wij = rjYij
and receive no gifts (Gij = 0). Substituting (4) into (3) and using (1), optimal effort (for a
specific realization of sij) and output are given by
ENGij =
[
rjsij
κi
]γ
(5a)
YNGij =
[
rj
κi
]γ
sγ+1ij (5b)
4.5 Definition of Gifts
Crucial to any analysis of gift giving is the definition of a gift. During our experiment the
definition seems simple: it is the size of the bonus paid to workers. Yet, its simplicity is due
to the fact that the piece rate is fixed. In settings where the firm can offer a gift by selecting
both a piece rate and a base wage the definition must be more general. Here, we define the
gift to be the gain in expected utility holding effort fixed at pre-gift levels. In particular,
let the original piece-rate contract be defined by rj and the effort level Eij(rj). Under a gift
contract, denoted by a piece rate, Rj and a base wage Bj, we define the gift to the worker
as
Gij(Rj, Bj, rj) =E
{
Bj + RjEij(rj)Sij − Ci
(
Eij(rj)
)− [rjEij(rj)Sij − Ci (Eij(rj))]}
=Bj + (Rj − rj)rγj Aij.
(6)
where E represents the expectations operator and
Aij ≡
E(Sγ+1ij )
κ
γ
i
. (7)
Note, this definition of gifts is empirically tractable - it depends on γ and Aij, both
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of which are identified given our data (see Section 5).11 Moreover, given (3), the gift is
simply the gain in expected earnings at pre-gift effort levels. Notice, as well, when the
piece rate is fixed at pre-gift levels (Rj = rj) (as it was during the gift experiment), the gift
is equal to the base wage; ie, Gij = Bj. Otherwise, (6) is very general, defining gifts in terms
of contractual changes in both the piece rate and a base wage that raise expected utility.
There is, however, a caveat: recent work suggests that the context in which contractual
changes are explained to workers affects reciprocity.12 We therefore only consider changes
in the contract to be gifts if they are explicitly explained to the workers as acts of kindness –
changes which are clearly in the short term interests of the firm or which are implemented
without explanation are not considered to be gifts.
4.6 Gifts and Reciprocity
When workers receive a monetary gift from the firm, Gij > 0 and their response depends
on their kindness parameter, β. Worker effort and output (given a realization of sij) are
given by
EGij =
[
(Rj + βGij)sij
κi
]γ
(8a)
YGij =
[
Rj + βGij
κi
]γ
s(γ+1)ij (8b)
Note, under the original piece-rate contract, Rj = rj, Bj = 0 and hence Gij = 0. Then, (8a)
and (8b) are equal to (5a) and (5b) respectively.
4.7 Expected Utility
In order for workers to accept a given contract, it must satisfy their participation constraint.
Note, this places additional restrictions on the contract. The expected utility constraint
11Alternatively, it would be possible to define gifts in (6) conditional on the shock Sij = sij. This would not
affect our parameter estimates given our experimental gift was given as a base wage (Gij = Bj in (6)) and thus
is independent of the way we treat Sij. It would however complicate the policy analysis of optimal gift-giving
contracts in section 8.3. See footnote 23 for a more detailed discussion.
12See Fehr, Goette and Zehnder, 2009, page 37.
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takes account, not only the value of the gift, but the reaction of the worker to that gift (in
terms of effort).
Substituting optimal effort, (5a) into (3) and taking expectations, worker i’s expected
utility in the absence of gifts is written
rγ+1j Aij
(γ + 1)
. (9)
In the presence of gifts, expected utility is given by
Bj +
[
Rj + βGij
](γ+1) Aij
γ + 1
− βGijrγj Aij (10)
4.8 Profits
The firm’s expected profit pi from worker i on block j under gift giving is given by
E(piGij ) = (Pj − Rj)E(YGij )− Bj
= (Pj − Rj)
[
Rj + βGij(Rj, Bj, rj)
]γ Aij − Bj. (11)
Notice that expected profits are a function of the structural parameters γ, β as well as the
parameter Aij capturing individual ability and planting conditions.
Profits can be calculated under piece-rate contracts (in the absence of gifts) by evaluat-
ing (11) at Rj = rj and Bj = 0, giving
E(piNGij ) = (Pj − rj)E(YNGij )
= (Pj − rj)rγj Aij. (12)
5 Identification and Estimation
From (11) and (12), calculating profits on the experimental block requires identifying γ, β
and Aij.13 We exploit two sources of experimental data to identify these parameters: the
piece-rate experiment and the gift experiment.
13Generalizing to other blocks would require imposing more structure on the estimation problem. One pos-
sibility would be to impose that piece-rate contracts satisfy the participation constraint of the lowest-ability (or
13
5.1 The Piece-Rate Experiment
The first source of identification is experimental variation in the piece rate, used to identify
γ. During this experiment, conducted in 2003, the piece rate paid to planters was exoge-
nously increased by 5 cents, from a base of either 18 cents or 23 cents. Let rT and rC denote
the treatment and control piece rates, respectively. Then, from (5b),
ln(YTij ) = γ ln(r
T
j )− γ ln(κi) + (γ + 1) ln(Sij) (14a)
ln(YCij ) = γ ln(r
C
j )− γ ln(κi) + (γ + 1) ln(Sij). (14b)
Let Jpr denote the number of blocks in the piece-rate experiment, and Ipr the number of
planters. Furthermore, define {Dbj : j = 1, 2, ..., Jpr} as dummy variables taking a value of
1 for block j, and 0 otherwise. Similarly, define {DIi : i = 1, 2, ..., Ipr} as dummy variables
taking a value of 1 for planter i, and 0 otherwise. Then, combining (14a) and (14b) gives
ln(Yij) = a0 +
Ipr
∑
i=2
a1iDIi +
Jpr
∑
j=2
a2jDbj + γ
(
ln(rTj )− ln(rCj )
)
DTij + eij (15)
where
a0 = −γ ln(κ1) + γ ln(rC1 ) + (γ + 1)E (ln Si1)
a1i = γ (ln(κ1)− ln(κi))
a2j = (γ + 1)
[
E
(
ln Sij
)− E (ln Si1)]+ γ (ln(rCj )− ln(rC1 ))
eij = (γ + 1)
[
ln Sij − E(ln Sij)
]
and
DTij =

1 if paid treatment piece rate on block j,
0 if paid control piece rate on block j.
The exogenous variation in the piece rate implies that the expected value of eij is equal to
zero, conditional on the included regressors. Hence, the model in (15) identifies γ.14
marginal) worker in the firm (denoted h), with productivity parameter κh = max{κ1, κ2, . . . , κn}. For example,
let u¯ denote the utility of worker h from leaving the firm (his outside option). Under these circumstances, Aij
can be written as
Aij =
[
κh
κi
]γ u¯
rγ+1j
(13)
a function of structural parameters and the piece rate paid on a particular block.
14Recall, we do not interpret the piece-rate experiment in terms of gifts, since the increase piece rate was not
presented to the workers as a gift; see footnote 5 and section 4.5.
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5.2 The Gift Experiment
The second source of identification comes from the gift-giving experiment, used here to
identify β and Aij for the block on which the gift-giving experiment took place. From (5b)
and (8b), and using the fact that Gij = Bj during the experiment, we can write
ln(YGij ) = γ ln
[
rj + βBj
]− γ ln(κi) + (γ + 1) ln(Sij) (16a)
ln(YNGij ) = γ ln(rj)− γ ln κi + (γ + 1) ln(Sij) (16b)
Combining (16a) and (16b) gives
ln Y?ij = γ[ln(rj + βBj)− ln(rj)]DGIFTij − γ ln(κi) + (γ + 1)E(ln(Sij)) + vij (17)
where
ln(Y?ij) = ln(Yij)− γ ln(rj)
vij = (γ + 1)
[
ln(Sij)− E(ln(Sij))
]
and
DGIFTij =

1 if receive gift,
0 else.
The model (17) includes individual-specific effects which are needed to recover an esti-
mate of Aij. In order to gain information over individual-specific heterogeneity we supple-
ment the experimental data with payroll data, collected on the experimental participants,
planting on blocks near to the experimental block. We specify (γ + 1)E(ln Sij) as a block-
specific effect, Dbj, and γ ln κi as an individual-specific term, DIi. The estimating equation
is
ln(Y?ij) = b0 +
Ig
∑
i=2
b1iDIi + γ[ln(rj + βBj)− ln rj]DGIFTij +
Jg
∑
j=2
b2jDbj + vij (18)
where Ig denotes the number of planters in the gift experiment and Jg the number of
blocks. The exogenous variation in the gift implies that the expected value of vij is equal
to zero, conditional on the included regressors. Hence, conditional on γ, the model in (18)
identifies β.
Notice as well that
Sγ+1ij = exp
(γ+1) ln(Sij) = exp(γ+1)E(ln(Sij))+vij
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giving
E
(
Sγ+1ij
)
= exp(γ+1)E(ln(Sij))E (expvij) .
Hence,
Aij =
E
(
Sγ+1ij
)
κ
γ
i
=
exp(γ+1)E(ln(Sij))
κ
γ
i
E (expvij)
= expb0+∑
Ig
i=2 b1i DIi+∑
Jg
j=2 b2jDbj × E (expvij)
which we estimate by
Âij = exp
bˆ0+∑I
g
i=2 bˆ1i DIi+∑
Jg
j=2 bˆ2jDbj ×∑
i
expvˆij
nj
where vˆij denote the residuals from (18).
5.3 Estimation of model parameters
We estimate our model parameters using a two-step, non-linear least squares estimator. In
the first step, we estimate γ from (15) using the experimental variation in the piece rate.
We then estimate β and Aij, conditional on γ, from (18) using the gift experiment data. To
calculate the critical value for the t-statistic on β, taking account of its dependence on γ,
we used the bootstrap technique.15
6 Descriptive statistics
Table 1 presents the summary statistics of the piece-rate experiment averaged over all
planters in both treatment and control conditions. The average daily number of trees
15The bootstrap proceeded as follows. First, we generated 999 bootstrap estimates of γ from the piece-rate
experiment. For each estimated value of γ, denoted γˆ?b , we then bootstrapped a sample from the gift-giving
experiment, estimated βˆ?b and calculated
t?b =
βˆ?b − βˆ
sβˆ?b
.
This gives 999 values of the bootstrapped test statistic which we order from smallest to largest. The upper-tail
(5%) critical value for the test statistic is the 975th value in the ordered series of t?b ; see, for example, Cameron
and Trivedi (2005), page 363.
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planted under the control conditions is 888.95, with a relatively high standard deviation.
Under the treatment conditions, the average number of trees planted climbs to 1012.39.
This reflects a 13.9% increase in planter productivity relative to the control conditions, a
change consistent with the higher piece-rates paid in the treatment conditions.16
Table 2 presents the summary statistics of the gift experiment averaged over all planters
in both treatment and control conditions. Under the control conditions, planters received
0.20$ per tree planted, yielding an average daily productivity of 1063.64 trees planted.
When the gift is handed out (treatment conditions), the average daily number of trees
planted is 1153.06, an 8.4% increase in planter productivity relative to planting without a
gift.
Table 3 presents the summary statistics for the gift-experiment planters, planting on
both experimental and non-experimental blocks. The average number of trees planted per
day is equal to 988 trees. This is lower than on the experimental block and reflects the fact
that the experiment was conducted on somewhat easier conditions than average. This is
also reflected in the fact that the average piece rate is $0.23, higher than that paid on the
experimental block. We note, however, that average earnings are very similar – $220 per
day when averaged over all blocks and $230 on the experimental block.
7 Estimation Results
The estimate of γ is equal to 0.39.17 A statistical test of the null hypothesis that γ is equal
to zero is rejected at all levels of statistical significance – the p-value is essentially equal to
zero.18
7.1 Homogeneous Response
The estimate of β is equal to .00071 and is statistically significant at the 5% level – the t-
statistic for β is equal to 1.77, while the (bootstrapped) critical value for the t-statistic is
16This pattern holds conditionally as well – productivity is higher under the treatment piece rate for each
block; see Paarsch and Shearer (2008), Table 2.
17Paarsch and Shearer (2008) also estimate a value of γ of 0.39 using the same data.
18Controlling for weather in (15) had no effect on the results.
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equal to 1.67. The worker’s marginal utility of reciprocating (returning an additional tree
to the firm in response to the gift) is given by βBj.19 Given Bj = 80$, the marginal utility is
estimated to be 0.057$.
7.2 Heterogeneous Response
To allow for heterogeneity in response to the gift we allow β to be a function of observable
individual characteristics: age and tenure. In particular, we specify
βi = β0 + β1 × tenurei + β2 × agei + β3 × agei × tenurei. (19)
The estimated response function is 20
βˆi =0.00042+ 0.00043× tenurei + (2.72e− 6)× agei − (9.79e− 6)× agei × tenurei
(0.71) (5.44)??? (0.24) (−5.54)???
(20)
Here, the estimated t-statistics are given in parentheses; ? ? ? denotes statistical signifi-
cance at the 1% level.21 The estimates suggest that reciprocity is associated with a longer
tenure within the firm, yet this effect is diminished with age. The positive effect of tenure
on reciprocity is consistent with Akerlof’s (1982) notion that the benefits from gift giving
increases with time spent in the firm; see, Bellemare and Shearer (2009) for a more complete
discussion.
The estimated individual responses to the gift along with the estimated values of Aij
(for the experimental block) are presented in Table 4. In general, the estimates show con-
siderable heterogeneity in response. The small number of treatment observations affects
the precision with which we can measure individual responses. Nevertheless, these re-
sponses are statistically significant at the 10% level for 10 planters, at the 5% level for 8
planters and at the 1% level for 2 planters. While the effect is estimated to be negative for
19Recall that Gij = Bj∀i during the experiment.
20The bootstrapped 1% critical values for a two-sided alternative are equal to 3.10 (β0), 4.06 (β1), 2.94 (β2)
and −3.88 (β3). The bootstrapped 5% critical values are equal to 2.45 (β0), 2.90 (β1), 1.98 (β2) and −2.85 (β3).
21We controlled for daily temperature, rainfall and day of the week in the estimation of (18). The estimates
of these parameters are available from the authors on request.
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one planter, it is not statistically significant. The Aij parameters are all very precisely esti-
mated. This is perhaps not surprising since this parameter represents average productivity
of individual i on the experimental block. Notice as well that from (7), E(Sγ+1ij ) is the same
across planters on block j, implying higher values of Aij represent more productive work-
ers (individuals with lower values of κi). The estimates show substantial heterogeneity in
planter productivity.
Table 5 provides further insight into the heterogeneity of worker responses to gifts and
their characteristics. The second column replicates the estimated value of βi from Table
4. Column 3 presents the estimated marginal utility to the worker of returning value to
the firm (βi × Bj) after receiving the experimental gift. These values are measured in dol-
lars per tree planted; they range from 1 to 19 cents per tree planted with an average of
6 cents over the sample. What is more, one-half of the sample displays very weak recip-
rocal preferences, earning marginal utility from reciprocating the gift of less than 5 cents
per tree planted. Columns 4 and 5 give the estimated response to the experimental gift in
real and monetary terms.22 Again, these numbers reflect the heterogeneity in reciprocity
among these planters: 7 out of the 18 planters returned value of less than $10 to the firm
in response to the $80 gift, while 3 planters returned value greater than $35; the maxi-
mum return to the firm was $56.80. The high proportion of planters with weak reciprocal
preferences will play an important role in the results of our policy analysis.
8 Policy Analysis
The firm received 35 cents for each tree planted on this contract and paid a piece rate of
20 cents to its workers, giving a net revenue of 15 cents per tree. The workers responded
to the firm’s gift with an increase of output in the order of 117 trees. Hence the 80 dollar
gift generated only 17 dollars of revenue – the exchange of gifts was not profitable for the
firm. However, it is important to bear in mind that the experimental gift was chosen by
economists, not the firm. Other gifts may well have generated profitable responses. To
investigate this we use our estimated parameters (allowing for heterogeneous response) to
22The total response can differ for two planters with the same value of β × Bj since total response also
depends on Aij, see (8b).
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calculate the profits of alternative gift contracts. Throughout this section, rj represents the
standard piece rate paid to all planters on the experimental block (denoted j) during the
gift experiment.
We consider gifts for which the firm must pay the same piece rate and the same base
wage to all planters planting on the same block. This corresponds to current firm practice
and avoids introducing extra contracting costs into the counterfactual analysis. Notice,
however that homogeneous contracts does not imply homogeneous gifts – the size of the
gift to any planter will generally depend on that planter’s ability (see (6)).
A necessary condition for gifts to be profitable is for the profit-maximizing gift to in-
crease profits vis-a`-vis profits in their absence. We therefore measure the economic rel-
evance of gifts by comparing profits earned under the profit-maximizing gift to profits
earned under piece-rates. We consider a number of cases: base-wage gifts, piece-rate gifts
and composite gifts (comprising both piece rates and base wages). Each is nested within
the following program: the firm chooses (Rj, Bj) to maximize23
max
Bj,Rj
Ig
∑
i=1
(Pj − Rj)
[
Rj + βiGij(Rj, Bj, rj)
]γ Aij − Bj (22)
subject to:
1. the participation constraint
Bj +
[
Rj + βiGij(Rj, Bj, rj)
](γ+1) Aij
(γ + 1)
≥ βiGijrγj Aij +
rγ+1j Aij
(γ + 1)
(23)
holds for each worker
2. gifts are determined by (6).
The participation constraint insures that workers are not worse off with a gift than without
a gift, taking into account their response to the contract.
23An alternative discussed in section 4.5 is to define the gift conditional on the shock sij which implies that
Gij would depend on the realization sij. The expected profit from worker i would then be given by
E(piGij |Rj, Bj, rj) =
∫
(Pj − Rj)
[
Rj + βGij(Rj, Bj, rj, sij)
κi
]γ
s(γ+1)ij f (sij)dsij − Bj (21)
Given the dependence of Gij on sij, identification of the expected profit requires identifying the distribution of
Sij and the distribution of ki. This would require possibly different data and/or additional model assumptions.
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8.1 Profitable Base-Wage Gifts
We first considered whether another experimental base-wage, Bj, provided as a gift on the
same block, at the same piece rate and to the same planters, would have been profitable
for the firm. In this case, we evaluated (22) at the estimated parameter values, subject to
(23) and (6), imposing that Rj = rj = 0.20.24 We found that profit maximizing base-wage
gifts were equal to zero. This suggests that no experimental base-wage gift would have
generated a profitable response from the workers on the experimental block within the
current labour market despite the fact that workers respond significantly to the gift.
A closer look at the effort function (8a) is revealing in considering these results. Since
output is measurable (and contractible) gifts and piece rates are substitutes. Furthermore,
because the piece-rate incentives are strong and workers’ response to the gift is relatively
small (the average βˆi = .0009) the profitability of a gift is attenuated at the observed piece
rate.
8.2 Profitable Piece-Rate Gifts
Next we considered the profitability of piece-rate gifts. Recall, that these gifts are increases
in the piece rate above market clearing levels, rj. In this case, we evaluated (22) at the
estimated parameter values, subject to (23) and (6) while imposing that Bj = 0.25 Here,
as in the case of base-wage gifts, we found the profit maximizing gift to be equal to zero,
suggesting there is no role for piece-rate gifts on the experimental block within the current
labour market.
24In practice, we evaluated a more specific problem in this case – allowing the firm to choose individual-
specific base-wage gifts. Since this gives the firm finer strategy space, profits will be higher than if one base
wage is given to each worker. Hence a finding of no profitable individual-specific base-wage gifts is stronger
than finding no profitable homogeneous base-wage gift.
25We performed a numerical grid search to find the profit-maximizing solution, considering values of Rj ∈
[0, Pj] where, recall, Pj is the price the firm receives per tree planted (equal to 0.35 in this case).
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8.3 Profitable Composite Gifts
Next, we considered composite gifts, allowing the firm to select both a piece rate and
a base wage to generate gifts to the workers. One might expect profits to be higher in
this situation since the firm now has two instruments to generate gifts. To proceed, we
calculated the contract that maximizes (22) subject to (23) and (6).26
Here, we found that gifts were positive, although very small. The average gift was
equal to $1.61, while the minimum gift was zero and the maximum gift was $2.94. Sur-
prisingly, the gifts were comprised of a negative base wage (-$2.56) and a small increase in
the piece rate ($0.204 versus $0.20). The negative base wage may seem to contradict pop-
ular notions of gifts, giving an abstract element to composite gifts. Recall, however, that
the gift is defined by the increase in expected utility (earnings) given pre-gift effort levels.
This is assured by the increase in the piece rate. Overall these gifts have a negligible effect
on firm profits in this context (less than one-half of 1%), suggesting that (even composite)
gifts have little role to play within the firm in the current context.
8.4 Different Labour Markets
Some authors have suggested that gifts are most useful in the presence of low-powered
explicit incentives.27 In the tree-planting industry, the level of the piece rate (for a given
set of planting conditions) is determined by the labour market; see section 2.2. To con-
sider how gifts would perform in the presence of low-powered incentives, we constructed
counterfactuals measuring the profitability of gifts under slack labour-market conditions
– conditions in which the firm can lower piece rates on the experimental block and still re-
tain all of its workforce. We hold the output price, worker ability and planting conditions
constant.
Calculating profits under different labour-market conditions requires that we extend
our model to capture how piece rates are determined; this requires additional assumptions.
26We performed a numerical grid search to find the profit-maximizing solution, considering values of Rj ∈
[0, Pj] and Bj ∈ [−50, 50].
27This can be due to crowding out (Fehr and Gachter, 2002) or due to multitasking problems rendering
high-powered incentives ineffective (Fehr and Falk, 2002).
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We assume that, in the absence of gifts, the firm chooses the piece rate to maximize profits,
subject to the participation constraints of the workers. Since workers are heterogeneous in
terms of ability (κi), we assume that the piece rate must satisfy the participation constraint
of the marginal worker in the firm – that worker with the highest cost of effort (lowest
ability), denoted κh.28 This ensures that the all workers are willing to participate on every
terrain planted. The firm’s problem, for a given planting block, is then given by
max
rj
Ig
∑
i=1
E(piNGij ) =
Ig
∑
i=1
(Pj − rj)E(YNGij )
=
Ig
∑
i=1
(Pj − rj)rγj Aij. (24)
subject to:
rγ+1j Ahj
(γ + 1)
≥ u¯. (25)
The solution to this problem is given by
r˜j = max
{
γ
γ + 1
Pj, rj
}
(26)
where
rj =
[
(γ + 1)u¯A−1h,j
] 1
(γ+1) , (27)
the piece rate that solves the marginal worker’s participation constraint.
The effect of the labour market operates through u¯, changing the value of the worker’s
outside alternative. Hence, holding conditions and ability (Ahj) constant, a decrease in the
value of u¯ decreases the piece rate rj that guarantees the participation of the workers. In
all cases, we consider values of rj ∈ (0.01, Pj).
Profit maximization censors the piece rate at γ/(γ+ 1)Pj, that rate at which the marginal
benefit of effort to the firm equals the marginal cost (the increase in earnings paid). Hence,
while the firm could set a piece-rate lower than γ/(γ+ 1)Pj when labor market conditions
deteriorate sufficiently, the incentive incorporated in such rates is too low. As a result, the
firm maintains the piece-rate at the profit maximizing level γ/(γ + 1)Pj in this range of
labor market conditions. Given Pj equals $0.35 in our data, the censored value of the piece
28Our model follows Shearer (2004) and is based on extensive discussions with firm managers.
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rate is 0.1. Note, as well, since r˜ now represents the piece rate that the firm would pay
on this block under the prevailing labour-market conditions, we now define the piece-rate
gift relative to r˜j.
Base-Wage Gifts
To investigate the profitability of base-wage gifts, we calculated the expected profits (based
on (22)) for different values of Bj ∈ [0, 100], holding Rj fixed at r˜j ∈ [0, Pj]. We find that
there exists no value of Bj such that the firm profits increase relative to the benchmark
profit maximizing level in the absence of gifts. This is true for all values of r˜j considered.
Hence, base-wage gifts would never be used in equilibrium. This suggests that base-wage
gifts have little role to play in this firm, even under labour-market conditions leading to
low-powered incentives.
8.4.1 Piece-Rate Gifts
To investigate the profitability of piece-rate gifts we calculated the expected profits (based
on (22)) for different values of Rj ∈ [0, Pj], holding Bj fixed at zero. We then computed
the overall profit change (averaging over all workers) relative to benchmark profits; that is
profits without gifts (based on (24) and (25)). We also computed the profit change relative
to benchmark profits for each worker. The latter was done in recognition of the fact that
workers have various predispositions to reciprocate to a gift from the firm, as revealed by
the heterogenous estimates of βi in Table 4.
The results are presented graphically in Figure 1. Note, the vertical line at rj = .1
divides the figure into two regions: rj > γ/(γ + 1)Pj and rj <= γ/(γ + 1)Pj. Consider
first the region rj > γ/(γ + 1)Pj. Recall, in this region, the participation constraint binds
and hence the non-gift piece rate is determined by labour-market conditions. Here we
found an economic role for gifts, particularly in the range rj < 0.15. Profits from gift
giving increase modestly in the range 0.1 < rj <= 0.15, reaching their peak at rj = 0.1
and remaining constant for all labour market conditions in the range rj <= 0.10. Over this
range a piece-rate gift would increase overall firm profits, vis-a`-vis the regular piece-rate
contract, by 3%. However, there is substantial heterogeneity in the relative profitability of
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the gift across workers – we find that the maximal increase in per-worker profits relative
to the benchmark is close to 15%.
More information on the heterogeneity of profits is given in Figure 2. Here we present
different percentiles from the distribution of the percent increase in profits across workers,
for different values of r¯j. As in Table 5 we see evidence of considerable heterogeneity across
workers. The percent increase in profits from a piece-rate gift is over 6% for 20 percent of
the workers when r¯j ≤ 0.1.29 Yet, it is less than 2% for at least one-half of the workers in
the firm. In fact, it is negative for 3 planters – those with the lowest values of βi. This is due
to the fact that when βi = 0, the effort and profit functions collapse to the piece-rate effort
and profit functions. Any increase in the piece rate above the profit-maximizing level r˜j
under such circumstances necessarily decreases profits for those workers.
Figure 3 presents the average and maximal gifts of workers across the different labour
market conditions. Here, we find that for rj ≤ 0.10 the average gift is $21 while the maxi-
mum gift is $28. Average and maximal gifts progressively decline to zero as rj approaches
0.15. Figure 4 presents the relative importance of gifts (measured as the gift as a propor-
tion of expected earnings in the absence of gifts).30 Here we see that gifts increase in rela-
tive importance as labour-market conditions worsen, attaining 27% of expected piece-rate
earnings for rj < 0.10.31
The increase in the profitability of gift-giving as labour market alternatives deteriorate
is directly related to the associated decrease of incentives. Slack labor market conditions
allow the firm to reduce the piece-rate paid to workers and still satisfy the participation
constraints of workers. In doing so, the marginal cost (in terms of effort) of responding
to the gift is also reduced. As a result crowding out diminishes – the marginal effect of
increasing the gift on average worker productivity increases.32
29 The workers for whom gifts are the most profitable are those who have worked at the firm for a long
period of time yet remain relatively young; those for whom the percent increase in profits is above 6% are
planters 4, 6, 13 and 18, all of whom are less than 40 years old and have tenure of 5 years or more (see Table 5).
30The relative importance of gifts is constant across workers for piece-rate gifts: Expected earnings in the
absence of gifts are given by rγ+1j Aij. It then follows from (6) that the relative importance of individual is gift
is (Rj − rj)/rj.
31Average earnings would be $80.00 in this case, reduced from $195 when the piece rate is 0.20.
32This can be illustrated using the model of Section 4. It follows from (8b) that the marginal effect of increas-
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8.4.2 Composite Gifts
Finally, we considered composite gifts in different labour markets, allowing the firm to
select both a piece rate and a base wage to generate gifts to the workers. To proceed,
we calculated the contract that maximizes (22) subject to (23), for different values of rj ∈
(0.01, 0.35). The results, presented graphically in Figures 5 through 10, suggest there is a
potentially important role for composite gifts within this firm under slack labour-market
conditions. Again, the vertical line at rj = .1 divides the graphs into two regions: rj >
γ/(γ + 1)Pj and rj <= γ/(γ + 1)Pj. Figure 5 shows that for the region r > γ/(γ + 1)Pj
the firm could increase overall profits by up to 10% by introducing composite gifts.
The distribution of profit increases is presented in Figure 6. Again, there is considerable
heterogeneity in the profitability of the gift across workers, although composite gifts are
generally more profitable than piece-rate gifts. We find that the maximal profit increase,
for a given worker, is 17% in the region rj <= γ/(γ + 1)Pj. The median profit increase is
11.1%, close to the average increase of 10.4%. Notice, even workers in the 20th percentile
of the distribution will provide profits over 8% under composite gifts.
Figure 7 shows the monetary size of the gifts. Gifts would be positive for 0.1 < rj <
0.20, with average gifts up to $20 and a maximum gift of up to $37.50. Average gifts vary
between $20 and $21.50 while the maximum gift varies between $28 and $49. The impor-
tance of gifts decreases as we approach the observed piece rate, yet the maximum gift is
still above $10 at a piece rate of $0.18. Figure 8 shows the relative importance of the average
and maximum gifts, again measured as the gift as a proportion of expected earnings in the
absence of gifts. As in Figure 4, gifts increase in importance as labour-market conditions
worsen with the average gift attaining 23% of average expected earnings for rj <= 0.10$;
the maximum proportion is over 0.3.
Figures 9 and 10 show the composition of the gift. Again, we find that the composite
ing the gift Gij on average worker productivity is given by
∂2E(YGij )
∂Rij∂Gij
= (γ− 1)γβi
[Rij + βGij
κi
]γ−2
E(s(γ+1)ij ) (28)
This cross partial derivative is negative when evaluated at the estimated parameter values (γˆ = 0.39, βˆi > 0.).
This indicates that all workers respond more to a gift when incentives are lower.
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gift takes an unexpected form: an increase in the piece-rate offset by a negative base-wage.
These gifts allow the firm to increase profits even for workers with βi = 0.33 In effect,
a gift in the form of a higher piece rate generates effort on two levels: first, through the
increase in the marginal return to effort; and second, through the reciprocal response to
the gift. The negative base wage allows the firm to claw-back some of the excess rents that
the high-incentive piece rate generates.
9 Discussion and Conclusions
This paper adds to the empirical literature on gift giving, concentrating on the profitability
of gifts within the firm. We have used field experiments to measure worker responses to
gifts, identifying structural parameters which permit the generalization of results beyond
the experimental setting.
Our results suggest that gifts do have a role to play in this firm. While the experimental
gift was not profitable, other gifts would have been. We estimate that firm profits for a
given worker would increase by up to 17 percent, vis-a`-vis a piece-rate contract, by the
introduction of a profit maximizing gift. However, only one-half of the workers in this
firm are predicted to reciprocate to a gift from their employer by increasing their effort
level. This reduces the overall profits the firm can attain through gift giving – average
profits increase 10%.
It is notable that gifts have an economic impact within a firm where output is mea-
surable. The principal of reciprocity states that workers will respond to gifts by returning
value to the firm. Yet, if measurable output is valuable (as in tree planting), then piece
rates and gifts are close substitutes and their use is determined by relative cost (or rela-
tive worker reaction to incentives). In our case, worker response to piece rates is relatively
high; hence piece rates limit the effect of gifts during the experiment. In situations where
the market clearing piece rate is low however (due to labour-market conditions in our
model), then the relative value of gifts increases. In other industries measurable output
33Workers for whom βi = 0 will still participate in such contracts as long as Bj + (R
(γ+1)
j − r
(γ+1)
j )Aij/(γ+
1) ≥ 0. The firm increases profits on such individuals if [(Pj − Rj)γ − (Pj − rj)γ]Aij − Bj ≥ 0.
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may not generate value to the firm (Holmstrom and Milgrom, 1991; Baker, 1992), further
increasing the relative value of gifts.
This paper also provides insights concerning the profitability of gift giving within the
firm. First, our results suggest that profitability will depend on the labor market con-
ditions of the workers. Indeed, the value of gifts is predicted to increase in periods of
economic downturn when workers have lower outside alternatives. Interestingly, these
results parallel efficiency-wage models: Shapiro and Stiglitz (1984) and MacLeod and Mal-
comson (1989) derive efficiency wages as self-enforcing implicit contracts that best supply
effort incentives within slack labour markets (when unemployment is high). Ackerlof’s
(1982) orginal work on gift exchange was largely attributed to the efficiency-wage liter-
ature, yet the mechanism here is very different; slack labour-market conditions allow a
profit-maximizing firm to reduce the piece rate paid to their workers and still satisfy their
participation constraints. In doing so, the marginal cost (in terms of effort) of responding
to the gift is also reduced, increasing the effect of a gift on average worker productivity.
Second, the composition of the monetary gift is predicted to have an important impact
on its profitability. Our analysis has revealed that gifts should be provided in the form of
above market clearing piece-rates as opposed to handing out (mostly unprofitable) fixed
wages. This finding has implications for existing experimental results that have failed to
find profitable base-wage gifts in environments with contractible output (Gneezy and List,
2006, for example). In such environments workers respond more strongly to piece-rate
gifts than to base-wage gifts – piece-rate gifts may be more effective.
Our results also have implications for the analysis of experimental data. Experiments
provide exogenous variation in contracts, simplifying the identification of treatment ef-
fects. Yet economists are increasingly calling for the generalization of experimental results.
Applying economic models to experimental data allows for the identification of structural
parameters, permits generalization and adds value to experiments. This is particularly
useful when seeking to generalize in directions not attainable using experimental methods
(such as different labour-market conditions).
Finally, we note that our model is static and neglects some dynamic issues associated
with gift giving. Perhaps the most important is the rate at which gifts can, or should be dis-
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tributed by the firm. Our results suggest that gifts have an effect on worker productivity
and can, under certain conditions, be profitable. Yet, an increasing body of evidence sug-
gests that the effects of gifts are short term (Gneezy and List, 2006; Bellemare and Shearer,
2009). Whether or not gifts can form the basis of a profitable, long-term personnel policy
or should only be used on special occasions remains a question for future research.
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Control Sample: 109 Observations
Variable Average Std. Deviation Gift Minimum Maximum
Number of Trees 888.85 325.46 390 1765
Piece Rate 0.21 0.03 0.18 0.23
Daily Earnings 182.65 50.40 89.70 317.70
Treatment Sample: 88 Observations
Variable Average Std. Deviation Gift Minimum Maximum
Number of Trees 1012.39 351.23 375 1965
Piece Rate 0.26 0.02 0.23 0.28
Daily Earnings 254.56 68.98 105.00 451.95
Table 1: Summary Statistics: Piece-Rate Experiment
Control Sample: 66 Observations
Variable Average Std. Deviation Gift Minimum Maximum
Number of Trees 1063.64 269.96 670 1625
Piece Rate 0.2 0 0.2 0.2
Piece-Rate Earnings 212.73 53.99 134 325
Gift 0 0 0 0
Total Daily Earnings 212.73 53.99 134 325
Treatment Sample: 18 Observations
Variable Average Std. Deviation Gift Minimum Maximum
Number of Trees 1153.06 323.23 705 1845
Piece Rate 0.2 0 0.2 0.2
Piece-Rate Earnings 230.61 64.65 141 369
Gift 80 0 80 80
Total Daily Earnings 310.61 64.65 221 449
Table 2: Summary Statistics: Gift Experiment
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Control Sample: 678 Observations
Variable Average Std. Deviation Gift Minimum Maximum
Number of Trees 978.82 309.4249 210 2100
Piece Rate 0.23 .04 0.16 0.35
Piece-Rate Earnings 219.57 59.25 48.30 420
Table 3: Summary Statistics: All Blocks
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Figure 1: Piece-Rate and Gift-Giving Profits with piece-rate gifts under different labour-
market conditions (r).
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Figure 2: Percentiles of profit increases with piece-rate gifts under different labour-market
conditions (r).
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Figure 3: Average and Maximum Gifts with piece-rate gifts under different labour-market
conditions (r).
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Figure 4: Gifts as proportion of earnings with piece-rate gifts under different labour-
market conditions (r).
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Figure 5: Piece-Rate and Gift-Giving Profits with composite gifts under different labour-
market conditions (r).
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Figure 6: Percentiles of Profit Increases with composite gifts under different labour-market
conditions (r).
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Figure 7: Average and Maximum Gifts with composite gifts under different labour-market
conditions (r).
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Figure 8: Gifts as proportion of earnings with composite gifts under different labour-
market conditions (r).
0
.
05
.
1
.
15
.
2
.
25
.
3
Pr
op
or
tio
n
0 .05 .1 .15 .2
rbar
Average Gift/Earnings Maximum Gift/Earnings
Composite Gifts: Gift as a Proportion of Expected Earnings
37
Figure 9: Composition of Gifts (The Piece Rate) with composite gifts under different
labour-market conditions (r).
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Figure 10: Composition of Gifts (The Base Wage) with composite gifts under different
labour-market conditions (r).
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